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There is a serious imbalance between the sclerosis of the political system of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the automatic adoption of WTO Appellate Body judicial reports. The 
question is whether the WTO Appellate Body will recognize bilateral political agreements (such as 
under Free Trade Agreements, FTAs) that modify WTO obligations between two parties. In 
addressing this question, the Appellate Body decision in Peru-Additional Duty on Imports of Certain 
Agricultural Products is important. The decision addressed the availability of defenses under FTAs in 
WTO disputes, as well as under public international law generally. After critically assessing the 
decision, we set forth a series of judicial and political choices for addressing the interaction of WTO 
and FTA rules going forward. In particular, we contend that clear modifications of WTO commitments 
under an FTA should be recognized by WTO panels as a defense, but subject to the FTA itself 
complying with WTO requirements under GATT Article XXIV. The case is important not only for 
trade specialists, but generally for policymakers and scholars of global governance in a world of 
fragmented international treaties. 
Keywords 
WTO, FTAs, variable levies, fragmentation. 
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Introduction* 
The case Peru-Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, brought by Guatemala, is 
among the most important cases before the World Trade Organization (WTO) in recent years. More 
mundanely, the Appellate Body decision addressed the consistency with WTO rules of Peru’s Price 
Range System (PRS) (Sistema de Franja de Precios) for four categories of agricultural products (milk, 
maize, rice, and sugar), pursuant to which Peru’s tariffs could vary fortnightly as a function of 
historical world prices. More systemically, since Peru and Guatemala agreed in a bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) that “Peru may maintain its Price Range System,” the Appellate Body decision 
addressed the interaction of WTO law with FTA rules, as well as public international law generally. 
The FTA provided, “in the event of any inconsistency” between WTO rules and FTA rules, the FTA 
rules “shall prevail.” The case is important not only for trade specialists, but also for policymakers and 
scholars of global governance in a world of fragmented international treaties and institutions. 
The WTO as a multilateral negotiating forum has become largely dysfunctional while trade 
negotiations and agreements proliferate in other bilateral and plurilateral venues, such as the Peru-
Guatemala FTA. In consequence, clarifying the relation of these trade agreements with WTO rules, as 
interpreted through the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, is critical. There is a serious imbalance 
between the sclerosis of the WTO’s political bodies and the automatic adoption of WTO Appellate 
Body reports. This imbalance is brought to light where the Appellate Body interprets the meaning of 
ambiguous provisions, and the losing party then challenges its authority by accusing it of illegitimate 
judicial activism and “gap filling,” especially when the losing party is a powerful country such as the 
United States (U.S.). Such a situation could undermine confidence in the WTO, including its so-called 
“crown jewel,” the WTO dispute settlement system, which has been uniquely authoritative as an 
international tribunal at the multilateral level, but whose authority appears to be at risk (Shaffer, Elsig 
and Puig 2016; Elsig, Pollack and Shaffer 2016). 
Some form of political process is needed to update international trade rules, which were set in 1994, 
and, where necessary, clarify their meaning in light of ongoing disputes and controversy over 
Appellate Body interpretations. Since the political negotiation over trade rules is blocked in the WTO, 
it has moved to bilateral and plurilateral forums. As of January 1, 2016, there were 419 such bilateral 
and plurilateral agreements in force, with others being negotiated. Where WTO Members modify trade 
rules that apply between them, or clarify their view of the rules’ meaning through bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements, what will be the response of the WTO Appellate Body? In Peru-Additional 
Duty, the Appellate Body gave guidance, the most to date, regarding its views, raising critical 
questions and concerns. 
As Robert Hudec (2000) wrote, GATT and WTO prescriptions about tariffs are not about “chastity,” 
since they permit protection in the form of tariffs so long as the tariffs do not exceed a WTO 
Member’s tariff binding as set forth in its tariff schedule. WTO Members generally have agreed to 
bind their tariffs at much higher rates for agricultural products than for industrial ones. In fact, the 
average bound rate for agriculture tariffs was 107% for India, 106% for Colombia, 98% for Turkey, 
and 16% for the European Union (E.U.) – Finger, Ingco and Reincke (1995). Peru had high bound 
rates, including a rate of 68% (from 2004) for the four categories of products at issue. Because Peru 
wished to liberalize its agricultural markets to a greater extent, subject to use of the PRS mechanism to 
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stabilize agricultural prices, it reduced its applied rates to 0%. The PRS was subject to Peru’s 
commitment that the applied tariff rate would never exceed Peru’s bound rate. 
Chile earlier applied an analogous scheme that the WTO Appellate Body found to be inconsistent 
with WTO rules in the Chile-Price Band (2002, 2007) cases, so that it was clear that Peru’s system 
could be subject to challenge. Peru, however, designed its PRS in a manner that was somewhat 
different than Chile’s, providing a possible defense under WTO rules. In addition, Peru negotiated 
FTAs with all of its major trading partners who arguably consented to the use of the PRS under the 
FTA in question. In 2011, Guatemala and Peru signed one of those FTAs, and Guatemala ratified it. 
When world prices dropped so that the application of Peru’s PRS increased the effective Peruvian 
tariff applied to certain Guatemalan products (namely sugar), Guatemala initiated a WTO complaint. 
Peru responded by refusing to take the final step of ratification (which only required the President’s 
proclamation) so that the FTA never went into effect.  
The WTO case thus involved two central issues. The first concerned whether Peru’s PRS violated 
WTO rules, namely because it constituted a “variable import levy” or “minimum import price” in 
violation of Article 4.2 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, or an “other duty or charge” in 
violation of Article II:1(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. At first 
glance, this first issue was easy. The panel and Appellate Body simply applied the Appellate Body’s 
earlier jurisprudence in Chile-Price Band to a related set of facts. In doing so, it clarified how to 
approach and analyze price range systems under WTO rules. Yet, as Bagwell and Sykes (2004) wrote 
in their analysis of the Chile-Price Band decision, it is not patently clear if the Appellate Body was 
correct given the ambiguity of the text interpreted, which we revisit in this paper from an economic 
and a legal perspective. 
The second issue concerned the relation of these WTO rules to the 2011 FTA between Peru and 
Guatemala that permitted Peru’s price range system. This second issue has become critically important. 
It poses the question of which rules apply in a defense before the Appellate Body: the Appellate 
Body’s interpretation of WTO rules in clinical isolation of the FTA, or WTO rules in light of the 
parties’ agreement in the FTA? The answer to that question implicates the following fundamental 
institutional question: who decides, a bilateral political process or a multilateral judicial one that 
ignores such political process (Shaffer & Trachtman 2011)? 
This paper critically analyzes the Appellate Body ruling on these two issues. Part I addresses the 
economics and political economy of price range systems for agricultural products generally and the 
operation of Peru’s system in particular. It first examines the variable import levies and minimum 
import prices that the E.U. earlier applied, which spurred intensive negotiations during the Uruguay 
Round, giving rise to the Agreement on Agriculture. It then assesses the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation of WTO rules applied to Peru’s PRS. Part II examines Peru’s negotiation of the 2011 
FTA with Guatemala and the Appellate Body’s treatment of the relation of the FTA to WTO rules. 
The Appellate Body could have simply followed the panel in finding that the FTA’s rules did not 
apply because the FTA never went into effect. Rather, the Appellate Body assessed the applicability of 
the FTA’s rules regardless of the FTA’s status, raising systemic questions of trade governance. After 
critically assessing the Appellate Body decision, we set forth a series of judicial and political choices 
for addressing the interaction of WTO and FTA rules going forward. In particular, we contend that 
clear modifications of WTO commitments under an FTA should be recognized by WTO panels, but 
subject to the FTA itself complying with WTO requirements regarding FTAs under GATT Article 
XXIV. 
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I. The WTO Legality of Peru’s Agricultural Price Range System  
There are policy trade-offs with agricultural tariff schemes aimed at stabilizing prices. On the one 
hand, as Saggi and Wu (2016) show, under a simple neoclassical economic model, stabilising duty-
inclusive import prices is harmful to a small open economy in economic welfare terms. On the other 
hand, they note that, in more complex models with frictions in factor markets, a lack of insurance 
markets and risk aversion, there may be benefits. They contend that trade intervention nonetheless is 
not the optimal policy, but this conclusion is subject to assumptions regarding the efficient functioning 
of tax collection and redistribution systems, which assumptions are questionable, especially in poorer 
countries. Moreover, the short-term attractions of stabilising internal prices through a PRS are fairly 
clear: no one likes uncertainty and change (we incur considerable costs to avoid it). This view applies 
particularly to agriculture, and particularly agriculture in poorer countries, in which the returns to fixed 
assets (land) are important, production decisions have to be taken well in advance of sale, and many 
producers are poor (at least relative to others in the same country). It is also true of food prices because 
food takes such a major share of poor people’s expenditure and so fluctuations have major effects on 
their real incomes. Stable prices are even attractive to importers: they know precisely what they will 
have to pay even if they do not know what goes to the exporter and what to the government. 
Stabilisation policies thus seem to be a triple win. The long-run attractions of attempting to stabilise 
prices nonetheless are less clear because, as the world changes, fixed prices get further out of line and 
eventually impose severe distortions on an economy. Promises to update them regularly to prevent 
such distortions are not always credible, not least because doing so undermines the very stability they 
aim to preserve. The use of price range systems thus has an economic rationale in some circumstances, 
but these systems shift the burden of volatility onto other countries and undermine the predictability of 
the import taxes faced by foreign traders, and so impose costs abroad. Countries thus have reasons to 
adopt international rules to address them. 
The use by the E.U. of variable levies was an important target for U.S. and other agricultural 
exporters during the Uruguay Round of negotiations that gave rise to the WTO. We thus start by 
reviewing the E.U.’s variable levy system (section A), then explain its impact on foreign traders, 
which helped spur the negotiation of new WTO rules (section B). We then explain Peru’s PRS 
(section C) and assess the panel and Appellate Body rulings on the PRS (section D). 
A. Variable Levies in Europe 
Variable levies (VLs) have a long and undistinguished history. Sampson and Snape (1980) trace them 
back to the early nineteenth century in the British Corn Laws and the French echelle mobile of 1819. 
They slipped into modern policy in the guise of minimum import prices in 1935 in a convention 
between Belgium and Luxembourg over Benelux’s trade policy (Tracy, 1989, p. 244) and into the 
E.U.’s Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in the Stresa conference of 1958 (Tracy, 1994).1 After the 
latter, VLs became an iconic part of the CAP, which was often viewed as a major achievement in 
economic integration and a central support for the maintenance of peace in Europe and was, 
consequentially, viewed as fundamentally non-negotiable.  
An important feature of the E.U.’s VL is that it was designed to achieve a fixed internal price (the 
so-called threshold price), which was fixed annually by policy. The price owed nothing to market 
forces because the levy was calculated every day to absorb the difference between the cif import price 
measured at Rotterdam and the politically determined threshold price.
2
 The effect of the VLs was thus 
                                                     
1
 The European Union is the current name of what once was known as the European Economic Community or the 
European Communities, albeit following an expansion in the membership. We use the modern name throughout. 
2
 To ensure that post-duty import prices met the threshold price precisely, one might think of determining the levy 
transaction by transaction, but that is so open to manipulation by traders that it is impracticable. Like the PRS, the E.U. 
scheme also made some adjustments for trade costs, but these did not change the principle. 
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to fix almost completely the duty-inclusive prices of imports and thus those faced by European 
producers and consumers of the affected products. Because the threshold price was high for a long 
period, the E.U. switched from being a net importer of some products to self-sufficiency and then to 
being a net exporter. The E.U. provided variable export subsidies as a complement to help maintain 
the high internal prices. The E.U.’s export subsidies particularly aggravated trading partners 
(especially the U.S.), even more than the VLs on imports. On a few occasions (although rarely), the 
world price exceeded the E.U. threshold price, in which case the E.U. taxed exports and subsidised 
imports (Pelkmans, 1997). As a result, except for the variation within the space of a day, the E.U. 
system combining variable levies and subsidies completely fixed E.U. internal prices. 
B. The External Impact of Variable Levies and the Negotiation of WTO Rules.  
While the E.U.’s variable levies had mixed benefits for the E.U., almost every other country in the 
world disliked them. First, they insulated European markets entirely from any developments in the rest 
of the world and to some extent from those in Europe itself. Consequently, European actors did not 
adjust to external shocks, with the result that all of the burden of such adjustment fell on non-European 
actors. That is, VLs may have achieved price stability in the E.U., but at the expense of exacerbating 
volatility elsewhere.  
To see how a variable levy shifts adjustment and uncertainty to the world market, imagine a simple 
world in which the domestic economy imports a commodity from the rest of the world. Denote the 
domestic country’s demand, supply and price as qd, qs and p respectively and the world’s as QD, QS 
and P respectively. Global equilibrium requires that domestic excess demand (imports) equals world 
excess supply (exports). Assume initially that home levies a specific duty of t on imports.
3
 Assuming 
linear functions and positive parameters, we can write an uber-simple model: 
qd = a – bp 
qs = c + ep 
QD = A - BP 
QS = C + EP 
p = P + t 
The parameter a is the level of demand if the price were zero and b describes the way in which 
demand falls from that level as the price rises. A and B play exactly the same role for the rest of the 
world. Similarly, c tells us supply if the price were zero and e the way in which it increases as price 
rises, and C and E act similarly for the rest of the world. Equating (QS-QD) and (qd-qs), and 





 . (1) 
Provided that A > C and a > c, the conditions for the demand and supply curves to intersect at positive 
quantities in the two markets, the world price is positive. Positive shocks to demand (i.e. increases in A 
or a) increase it while those to supply (to C and c) decrease it, as does an increase in the tariff (t).  
Now replace the specific duty by a variable levy which fixes the domestic price at an exogenously 
given level, p*. The expression for the world price now becomes  
 
                                                     
3
 The comparison between a duty and a variable levy is easier to conceptualise in terms of specific duties because the 
variable levy adds a specific amount to the import price to bring it up to the required threshold price. The same idea holds 
for an ad valorem duty, but the algebra is slightly messier.  





 . (2) 
Because (b + e) > 0, any shock to the underlying supply and demand functions will have a greater 
effect in (2), i.e. under a variable levy, than in (1), under a specific duty.
4
 From the basic functions, a 
larger shock to P implies larger shocks to QD and/or QS. 
The second objection to VLs was that E.U. threshold prices were set so high that VLs implied a 
high level of protection – with a consequent loss of market access for efficient producers outside 
Europe. In fact, perhaps because the protection was not as obvious as with a tariff, VLs ended up 
conferring huge levels of protection in many E.U. agricultural markets. A third objection was that, at 
the level of individual transactions, an exporter facing a VL loses much of the incentive and ability to 
innovate to increase his/her exports. If an exporter manages to reduce her cost and hence price, that 
reduction is absorbed into the levy the very next day, so that there is no expansion of overall demand. 
It is true that the exporter may be able to increase her market share at the expense of other exporters, 
but this is an unattractive zero-sum game which exporting countries have very little interest in 
pursuing or even permitting. That is, VLs stultify competition. 
The E.U. is obviously large enough to impose material costs on its trading partners via both the 
terms of trade effects of protection and the transmission of instability. In contrast, if a small country 
such as Peru were guilty of such behaviour, its effect on the rest of the world would be 
correspondingly small and therefore may not be worth contesting. However, first, even a small 
economy may be large to one of its neighbours if the latter depends heavily on it for trade. Second, if 
every small country behaved in this way, the effects would add up to something significant. Third, 
even violations by insignificant players can undermine the credibility of the system and thus increase 
the chances that larger players will transgress. Peru fits this situation – it is not large enough to impose 
serious costs on the vast majority of trading nations - but given the almost iconic status of variable 
levies in the struggle to create the WTO it might be felt that to allow one to pass unchallenged was a 
step too far.  
The frictions over agriculture between the U.S. and the E.U. are well documented (Josling and 
Tangermann, 2015) and variable levies were a major part of them. In the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations, the U.S. aimed to eliminate agricultural protection, and from an early date pressed the 
case for ‘tariffying’ all trade barriers other than ordinary customs duties - i.e. converting them into 
tariffs of the same protective effect - and then gradually reducing those tariffs to zero. The Round 
nearly came to grief several times over agriculture, but at the last moment agreement was reached, 
including to tariffy non-tariff barriers and then reduce (but not eliminate) the tariff rates they implied.
5
  
This agreement was incorporated into the Agreement on Agriculture, Article 4.2 of which 
prohibited “…measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs 
duties…” with its ostensibly clarificatory footnote that these “include … variable import levies, 
minimum import prices, … and similar border measures….”. For our purposes, two aspects of the 
agreement are of note. First, the degree of tariff liberalisation achieved was actually rather small and 
as early as 1995, commentators were claiming that the Round’s main achievement in agriculture was 
not that it had reduced trade barriers but that the system had been rationalised and that through 
tariffication the means to future liberalisation had been secured: see Hathaway and Ingco (1995, p. 58), 
                                                     
4
 The denominators are different in equations 1 and 2 because when there is a fixed tariff, both foreign and domestic 
markets adjust to shocks - via (B and E) and (b and e) respectively - whereas when there is a (perfect) variable levy, the 
domestic market does not adjust, so only foreign flexibility (B and E) operate. This difference captures precisely the fact 
that for a given shock - to, say, A - the foreign price changes more because there is no change in the domestic price to get 
the domestic market to adjust. 
5
 The negotiations over agriculture are summarized in greater detail in the Appendix, part A, from which the following 
paragraphs draw.  
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or Josling, Tangermann and Warley (1996, p. 218) who write, the Uruguay Round’s accomplishment 
of “tariffication of import barriers in agriculture… [was] a quantum leap forward in the long process 
of bringing agriculture fully into the realm of the GATT.”. If this was all that seven years’ hard 
politicking had produced, it is easy to see why trade officials, especially those from the WTO and the 
agricultural exporting nations, became so wedded to the principle of tariffication and the elimination 
of variable levy and minimum import price schemes.  
The second aspect of note is that, as we discuss below, Article 4.2 is ambiguous because ‘of the 
kind’ is not precise and the footnote is only illustrative (it says ‘include’). However, one can arguably 
see the intent of the negotiations because the staff document issued immediately after the Agreement 
was signed to guide its implementation – the so-called ‘Modalities’, (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24) – states 
in Annex III, Section A, paragraph 1: 
“The policy coverage of tariffication shall include all border measures other than ordinary customs 
duties such as: quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, … 
and any other schemes similar to those listed above, ….” (Emphasis added) 
Although the Modalities provide that they “shall not be used as a basis for dispute settlement 
proceedings” (p. 1), the text makes clear the expectation that everything other than “ordinary customs 
duties” was liable to tariffication.  
C. Peru’s Price Range System  
There are clear differences between the E.U.’s system of VL’s and Peru’s PRS. In practice, Peru’s 
PRS determines the internal price much less closely than the EU’s VL system, and is thus much more 
subject to market forces. Unlike the E.U.’s VL system, moreover, the PRS was subject to a 
commitment that Peru’s applied tariff would never exceed its bound rate. Many Latin American 
officials were of the view that price range systems, as that used by Peru, were legal so long as the 
applied tariff did not exceed the tariff binding in its schedule. In fact, the Economic System of Latin 
America (SELA) apparently sought and received assurance from GATT officials that as long as PRS-
like policies resulted in a tariff below the bound level, there was no problem, although we have seen 
no supporting documentation.
6
 Thus, the question arises whether Peru’s tariff binding, combined with 
its PRS, was sufficient to comply with Peru’s WTO undertakings. Were the differences between the 
E.U.’s system of levies (varying by day based on a fixed threshold price, and not subject to a tariff 
binding), and Peru’s PRS large enough that the PRS would not be considered a variable import levy or 
minimum import price inconsistent with WTO rules on tariffication? Table 1 offers a comparison 
between the E.U.’s VL system and Peru’s PRS, which we further explain below. 
  
                                                     
6
 Email from Alejandro Jara, former Ambassador of Chile to the WTO, and Deputy Director General of the WTO. Article 
5 of the Agreement on Agriculture permits countries to exceed their tariff bindings for agricultural products they have 
‘tariffied’ under certain conditions and provided they have reserved the right to do so in their tariff schedules. The fact 
that Peru did not reserve this special safeguard right regarding the four categories of agricultural products in question 
might be viewed as providing some support for the claim that it understood that the PRS was considered already to 
constitute an ordinary customs duty and thus was not required to be eliminated. Josling, Tangermann and Wartley (1996, 
pp. 190-191) noted that Latin American price band policies “could potentially still be considered an ‘ordinary customs 
duty,’” but warned that “issues may well arise as to [their] GATT-legality.”  
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Table 1. A comparison between the E.U.’s Variable Levies and Peru’s PRS 
Dimension E.U.’s Variable Levies Peru’s PRS 
Target price Internal price set by policy Long-run average on world market 
Reference price based on  Imports into EU Sales on the world market 
Frequency of fixing daily fortnightly 
Applied to which commodity Just the commodity in question  Duty from marker products 
extended to associated products 
Duty capped at binding? No Yes 
Import subsidies? Yes No 
Export subsidies/taxes? Yes No 
Achieves minimum import 
price? 
Almost certainly Less certainly unless Peru’s import 
prices mirror world prices 
precisely. 
Peru’s PRS covers 45 agricultural products, separated into four general categories: milk, yellow maize, 
rice, and sugar.
7
 Within each category, one tariff line is designated a “marker” product and all others 
as “associated” products. Floor and ceiling prices are determined for each marker product on the basis 
of the monthly average f.o.b. (freight on board) prices for the past 60 months on the international 
reference market for that marker product corrected for U.S. inflation. These prices are updated semi-
annually and converted into c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) floor and ceiling prices.
8
 In addition, a 
reference price for the marker product is calculated every two weeks as the average international 
market price for the product over the preceding two weeks, also converted to c.i.f terms.
9
 
Whenever the international reference price, p
R
 falls below the floor price, 𝑝𝐹, a variable additional 
duty is levied on the imported good to bring its price up to the floor level. Letting b denote an 
allowance for the import costs associated with marker products, the additional variable duty 𝐴𝐷 is 
given by: 
 
𝐴𝐷 =  (1 +  𝑏) (𝑝𝐹– 𝑝𝑅)    (3) 
This prevents low import prices from being passed onto Peruvian farmers and consumers. When, on 
the other hand, the reference price is above the ceiling price, 𝑝𝐶 , a tariff rebate is issued to the 
importer to bring the net price down to the ceiling level. It equals: 
 
𝑇𝑅 =  (1 +  𝑏) (𝑝𝑅 −  𝑝𝐶)    (4) 
This serves to protect Peruvian consumers from undesired price increases on the global market.  
The declared objectives of Peru’s PRS were to foster price stability, counter the adverse effects of 
price distortions in international markets, and improve domestic competitiveness. In the words of the 
PRS, they were:  
                                                     
7
 For a complete list at the HS-10 level, see Panel Report., para. 7.121. See Saggi and Wu’s (2016) for an earlier 
description and assessment of the PRS. 
8
 Ibid., paras. 7.127-7.135. In addition, for sugar the prices are increased by 44.1% of the floor price between September 
2002 and January 2006 and by 10.7% of the floor price thereafter – Ibid. para 7.131.  
9
 Ibid., paras. 7.136-7.139. 
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to counter the adverse effects to domestic agricultural production on account of “distortions . . . 
due, in particular, to the agricultural policies implemented by the main food producing and 
exporting countries” and as “reflected in the uncertainty and instability of domestic prices”
10
; 
to provide “a stabilization and protection mechanism that makes it possible to neutralize the 
fluctuations of international prices and limit the negative effects of the fall in those prices”; and 
to provide “an appropriate means of improving the levels of competitiveness of domestic 
producers, by giving the market clear signals with regard to trends in prices, thereby allowing 
economic agents to operate efficiently and productively . . . .”
 11
 
The PRS purports to stabilize prices in the short run and offer an element of protection to farmers by 
pegging local prices to world prices over the long run.
12
  
Our first question is: did the actual design of Peru’s PRS achieve the stated objectives, initially for 
the marker products and subsequently for the associated products as well? Even for the marker 
products, the PRS’s stabilisation is incomplete and its protection somewhat covert and arbitrary. As 
just noted, the system is anchored to the long-run mean world price of the marker products from which 
we infer that the long-run price is in some sense an objective and hence an appropriate bench-mark 
against which to measure the PRS’s performance. A price-band scheme aimed purely at stabilisation 
would allow prices to vary within a band around the mean price (μ), with more extreme fluctuations in 
either direction curtailed according to equations (3) and (4) above. The band in the PRS is set equal to 
the standard deviation of world prices measured over the five year anchor period (s), but instead of 
spanning the mean price such that the range is (μ – s/2) to (μ + s/2), it rests on the mean price, giving a 
range of μ to (μ + s). To a first order approximation, this design feature rules out local prices ever 
falling below the long-run world mean and results in the mean duty-inclusive import price being about 
s/2 above the mean long-run world price μ.13 The value of s clearly depends on the variability of the 
reference prices over the preceding five years and so it is both variable and uncontrollable. Over our 
sample of data – see below – s ranges from 7.5% of the long-run world mean price (for dairy products 
over early 2002) to 47.2% (for rice in 2010), so the price-raising effect of using the long-run price as a 
minimum rather than an average is to increase average prices by around 3.7% to 23.6%. 
The Peruvian PRS has two other modifications relative to a simple price band. First, as noted above, 
the additional duty under the PRS was capped so that the sum of the additional duty, the ad valorem 
tariff (of 0% after 2010), and (while it lasted) an import surcharge did not exceed the ad valorem rates 
bound under the Uruguay Round. Peru’s bound rates for the four marker products, in fact, were quite 
high, so that Peru’s applied tariffs never exceeded and almost always remained below them: 68% for 
all four categories from 2004 onwards.
14
 Peru set an additional surcharge at 5% until 2007 and then 
abolished it.  
The second modification is that when prices exceed the ceiling price, Peru caps the rebate it 
provides importers to the total level of duties (ad valorem and surcharge) they paid. Because Peru 
liberalized its agricultural trade through low applied rates (eventually set at zero), this restriction 
considerably constrains the PRS’s ability to mitigate the transmission of increases in world prices and 
                                                     
10
 It is, of course, likely that any such distortions will have affected the floor and ceiling prices as well. 
11
 Ibid., para. 7.118. 
12
 There is also a brief genuflection towards consumers – Panel Report para. 7.119 – but it is clearly secondary to the 
producer interest. 
13
 The precise amount of the uplift depends on the distribution of the reference prices over the range μ to (μ + s). 
14
 In the Uruguay Round developing countries agreed to reduce their so-called base tariffs in ten equal annual steps starting 
in January 1995. Thus between 2001-2004 Peru was committed to reduce base tariffs from 103% for rice, 90% for maize, 
87% for sugar, and 77% for dairy to the bound rate of 68%.  
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imparts a significant upward bias to the average duty-inclusive import price.
15
 With an applied tariff 
rate at zero, the PRS only served to increase Peru’s applied tariffs, not to reduce them, giving rise to 
no additional benefits to consumers.  
The effects of these adaptations of the simple price-band model on the degree of price protection 
and stabilisation for the four marker products are shown in Table 2. We define protection as the mean 
percentage excess of the price resulting from the policy intervention over the long-run mean world 
price and stabilization as the root mean square of the percentage change in the price from one fortnight 
to the next
16
. As described in Appendix part B, the calculations are conducted on data from June 2001, 
the start date of the PRS, to September 2013, essentially the same data used by the Panel in its 
consideration of the PRS.  
Table 2. Mean deviations from long-run world mean price and fortnightly variability – four 
marker products 
 1 2 3 4 
 reference price centred range PRS actual range PRS with caps 
     
dairy: whole milk in powder, no added sugar, 0402 21 19 00 
Mean 15.0% 3.2% 8.7% 15.5% 
RMS(%Δ) 3.6% 2.7% 3.2% 2.9% 
 
maize: No. 2 yellow maize, 1005 90 11 00 
Mean 26.4% 5.8% 12.6% 22.9% 
RMS(%Δ) 4.7% 3.3% 3.6% 4.2% 
 
rice: white rice, 1006 30 00 00  
Mean 13.7% 3.7% 11.4% 19.7% 
RMS(%Δ) 3.7% 2.3% 2.4% 3.6% 
 
sugar: refined white sugar 1701 99 00 90 
Mean 23.3% 1.1% 28.5% 35.4% 
RMS(%Δ) 4.6% 3.8% 3.4% 4.3% 
Since the price range system is anchored on the five-year average of the reference price (updated every 
six months), Table 2 reports the mean percentage deviation of the adjusted price from this target and 
also the root mean square of the percentage change in price from one fortnightly period to the next 
[RMS(%Δ)]. Column 1 reports the deviations for the reference prices themselves – i.e if there were no 
PRS policy at all - which shows that over this sample, world prices were on average well above the 
                                                     
15
 In addition, as noted above, the prices used in the calculations are also modified by a cif-fob adjustment and an allowance 
for the cost of importing the marker product, but neither imparts any significant bias or changes the basic principles of the 
PRS.  
16
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target and that they displayed considerable variability – 3.6% to 4.7% per fortnight. Column 2 
considers a pure price range system centered on the target mean price. Even here, because of the way 
that prices are distributed within the band, the mean deviation is positive, but not substantially so. 
Thus a centered PRS would have induced a considerable reduction in the mean price relative to the 
reference price by bringing the very high prices of the period 2005-08 down to the ceiling price and 
also reduced fortnightly changes. Column 3 considers the PRS’s actual range but with no caps or 
limits on its application, while column 4 adds in the effect of the caps on the ad valorem equivalent 
and the tariff rebate, and so is as close as we get to what actually happened. Because the reference 
price was at times above the ceiling price and the applied ad valorem tariff was eventually set at zero, 
Peru eventually granted no rebates. This lack of a rebate explains why the mean price is so much 
higher in column 4 than in column 3. It also served to increase the fortnightly variability in three of the 
four commodities, because the post-duty price fluctuated with the reference price rather than being 
pinned to the ceiling price; the exception is milk for which there was a 47% hike in the ceiling price in 
July 2008, so that if the rebate had not been capped there would have been a huge jump in the policy-
adjusted price, whereas the absence of an effective rebate had prevented the PRS from keeping the 
price down in the preceding period. Figure 1 compares the reference prices and those emerging from 
the PRS for the four products.  
If the Peruvian authorities were truly aiming to replicate the (long-run) world average prices for the 
four market products and to reduce price variability about them, a centered PRS would do this quite 
effectively. However, by grossing up the sugar price, rebasing the PRS to rest on the mean and by 
limiting rebates to the duties paid (for which there were none once applied rates were set at zero), the 
PRS design created a substantial positive bias to mean prices and generally increased variability. In 
three out of the four products, the mean price induced by the actual PRS exceeds that of the reference 
price (compare columns 4 and 1) and for none of them is variability reduced by more than a quarter. 
Thus, as it turned out, the PRS’s design delivered more by way of protection than by way of 
stabilization (again because the applied rates otherwise were set at zero). It functioned to protect 
farmers from low world prices while allowing them to benefit from high world prices, as Figure 1 
makes clear.  
The objective of protecting farmers from low prices is particularly salient for sugar, which is the 
only PRS commodity for which, according to Saggi and Wu (2016), Guatemala exported significant 
amounts to Peru. The FTA negotiations between Guatemala and Peru were initiated under a protocol 
agreed in October 2010 and the agreement was signed in December 2011. At both times, the reference 
price exceeded the PRS ceiling price so that no additional duties applied. By August 2012, however, 
the reference price had fallen below the PRS floor price and Peru levied ‘additional variable duties’ on 
sugar, which rose to about 25% by April 2013, when Guatemala sought WTO consultations about the 
PRS, and by 30% by September 2013, when the WTO panel was formed. This world price change and 
its effect under the PRS explains why Guatemala faced less producer pressure when signing the FTA 
in 2011, and why producer pressure likely induced Guatemala to bring the WTO complaint in 2013. 
Our analysis so far concerns just the four marker products and their prices averaged over periods of 
a fortnight. In fact, prices fluctuate within the fortnight so the short-run stabilization is less than 
indicated above, although probably only trivially. More significant is that while the PRS is anchored to 
the long-run mean world price, the prices of imports of the marker products into Peru may well differ. 
Systematic differences will affect the degree of protection that the PRS actually provides in Peru (it 
will be lower if Peruvian import prices persistently exceed world price). For the associated products, 
the PRS’s stabilizing and mean-raising properties will similarly depend on the extent to which their 
prices parallel those of their relevant marker products.  
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In sum, although not nearly as protectionist as the E.U.’s earlier system of variable levies and 
minimum import prices, the design of Peru’s PRS arguably provided more protection than stabilization 
of prices. Moreover, Peru’s tariffs could and often did vary on a fortnightly basis, opening them to a 
WTO legal challenge that they were variable import levies in contravention of WTO rules. Although 
WTO rules permit countries to negotiate agricultural tariff bindings at high levels, they prohibit the 
use of variable import levies for agricultural products, regardless of the tariff rate, as we will see. 
D. The Appellate Body Decision on Guatemala’s PRS Claims 
The first group of WTO legal questions in the case, outside the relation of FTA and WTO rules, were 
three-fold: (i) whether Peru’s PRS gave rise to variable import levies (or measures similar to them) in 
violation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture; (ii) whether the PRS involved minimum 
import prices (or measures similar to them) in violation of that same article; and (iii) whether the PRS 
gave rise to duties that were not “ordinary customs duties,” but rather “other duties or charges” not 
listed on Peru’s tariff schedule, in violation of Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994.  
The panel and the Appellate Body first analyzed the claims under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
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agricultural tariff scheme. Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides that “Members shall 
not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have been required to be converted 
into ordinary customs duties, except as otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5.”17  It is 
accompanied by a footnote that provides, “[t]hese measures include quantitative import restrictions, 
variable import levies, minimum import prices, … and similar border measures other than ordinary 
customs duties” (emphasis added). Implicitly from this text, if an agricultural tariff is either a variable 
import levy or a minimum import price, then it is not an ordinary customs duty for purposes of the 
Agreement on Agriculture and the GATT.  
The key question was whether Peru’s measures were “of the kind which have been required to be 
converted into ordinary customs duties.” Since the term “ordinary customs duties” is not defined, and 
since the agreement does not specify what “kind” of measures were required to be converted other 
than the non-exclusive list contained in the footnote, the text is not without ambiguity. The panel and 
Appellate Body thus focused on whether Peru’s scheme was a “variable import levy” or a “minimum 
import price,” or a measure “similar” to one, which terms are not defined.  
This legal issue was straightforward in light of the Appellate Body’s analysis in its 2003 decision 
in Chile-Price Band regarding the meaning of these terms. In that case, the Appellate Body found that 
Chile’s price band was sufficiently similar to a variable import levy and a minimum import price so as 
to contravene Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The Appellate Body bolstered its 
interpretation of the text through addressing “the object and purpose” of Article 4, 18  which it 
maintained is to enhance “transparency and predictability” of ordinary customs duties19 in order “to 
achieve improved market access conditions for imports.”20 Peru aimed to differentiate its PRS on the 
grounds that its system was transparent and predictable because the price bands and reference prices 
were published on the government’s website and the prices changed only every two weeks. For the 
panel and Appellate Body, however, these changes were not sufficient and they both repeatedly cited 
the Chile-Price Band precedent to find that the duties were “variable.” This finding raises the question 
posed by Saggi and Wu (2016) in their analysis of the panel decision in Peru-Additional Duty as to 
whether a PRS can be designed to vary less frequently (say once a month, or once every six months) 
so that it could pass muster under the Appellate Body’s analysis.  
That question, however, could be moot in light of the Appellate Body’s suggestion that the PRS 
gave rise to “minimum import prices.” The panel found that Peru’s PRS did not give rise to a 
minimum import price because the scheme was built on a reference price based on world prices, and 
not on individual transaction prices. Peru could thus give examples of individual transactions that were 
sold at less than the floor price under the PRS without incurring an additional duty because the 
reference price was still within the band. The Appellate Body, however, reversed the panel’s findings 
that Peru’s PRS did not result in a minimum import price because the panel failed to properly assess 
its structure, design, and operation, but rather focused predominantly on the system’s effects. The 
Appellate Body did not complete the analysis, finding that it did not need to do so given its finding 
that the PRS gave rise to variable import levies. The Appellate Body nonetheless strongly suggested 
                                                     
17
 Article 5 covers “special safeguards” indicated on countries schedules for products where measures have been converted 
into ordinary customs duties (which permits agricultural price stabilization through increased tariffs where prices drop 
below a world reference price or imports grow above a prescribed rate), and Annex 5 provides for special treatment of 
certain products (namely rice for certain Asian countries) subject to conditions. 
18
 The Appellate Body has generally been very textualist in its interpretations and stayed away from teleological 
interpretations. See Cook 2015, para. 15.32 (“WTO adjudicators have been wary of certain forms of reasoning by 
reference to object and purpose, and have generally been cautious about attaching too much weight to the object and 
purpose of a treaty as a basis for its interpretation”). 
19
 AB Report, para. 234. 
20
 AB Report, Chile Price-Band, Article 21.5, para.149, cited in AB Report, Peru-Additional Duty, para. 5.39. 
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that it could find that the measure was similar to a minimum price import, as it had found in the earlier 
case against Chile.  
As noted above, Peru’s system did not involve a classic de jure minimum import price requirement 
— it was based on the world reference price in relation to a five-year average world market price, and 
not on whether an individual transaction fell below a specified price. However, to the extent that 
transaction prices in agricultural markets generally tend to track world prices reflected in a reference 
price, the design, structure, and operation of Peru’s PRS could be viewed as “similar” to a “minimum 
import price.” Likewise, although the classic variable import levy of the E.U. varied the levy by the 
day, as opposed to a reference price that varies every two weeks, the design, structure, and operation 
of Peru’s PRS could be viewed as at least “similar” to a variable import levy in that they duty could 
(and often did) vary every two weeks, depending on the reference price.  
Once the panel and Appellate Body found that the PRS gave rise to a variable import levy, they 
easily concluded that the PRS was not an “ordinary customs duty” within the meaning of GATT 
Article II.1(b). The determination of the Article 4.2 claim under the Agreement on Agriculture, in 
other words, effectively determined the GATT Article II(1)(b) claim because the footnote to Article 
4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture notes “variable import levies” and “minimum import prices” as 
examples of measures that are not “ordinary customs duties.”21 As a result, both the panel and the 
Appellate Body found that the tariff measures were “other duties and charges” that Peru had not listed 
in its schedule, so that Peru also violated GATT Article II.1(b).
22
  
There may be good legal grounds to maintain that the design, structure, and operation of Peru’s 
measures are similar to a variable import levy and (possibly) a minimum import price. Yet, given that 
there is some ambiguity in the text (regarding the definition of variable import levy), given that Peru’s 
applied tariffs were set at zero so long as the reference price fell within the five-year average, given 
that Peru was authorized to raise its tariffs to 68% (which was its WTO tariff binding), and given that 
Peruvian policy makers see a rationale for a PRS to provide some stability to agricultural markets for 
farmers, especially poorer ones who otherwise may be unable to tap into insurance markets, it seems 
worth seeking a solution. The current situation places stains on the system which, if not resolved 
through an acceptable dispute outcome or through a mutually agreed settlement, could lead to a 
Member either raising its tariff bindings in a blunt way to block imports (possibly up to its tariff 
binding), or defying the Appellate Body. The third alternative, which is an interpretation of what 
happened here, is that the Member may negotiate a political agreement, such as through a series of 
FTAs, and ask the Appellate Body to recognize those agreements. 
The WTO legal dispute in Chile-Price Band on this issue lasted seven years, from October 5, 2000 
when Argentina first filed its complaint, until May 7, 2007 when the Appellate Body issued its Article 
21.5 ruling that Chile had still not complied with the Appellate Body ruling of September 23, 2002. 
Chile continues to use a price band subject to its WTO tariff binding, a binding that it renegotiated to 
increase to 98% for sugar after the WTO ruling.
23
 There was, in other words, lots of law, but little 
                                                     
21
 If the Appellate Body considered the negotiators’ intentions as indicated by the Modalities, the determination under 
Article 4.2 also comes back to the “ordinary customs duty” question. The modalities make clear that anything that is not 
an “ordinary customs duty” was expected to be tariffied regardless of whether it resembled the illustrative policies 
provided in the footnote. 
22
 Article II.1(b) provides: “Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or 
in connection with the importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and 
mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date.” 
23
 Our understanding is that Argentina initiated the dispute because Chile did not honor a political undertaking that it made 
in relation to a safeguard and price band that gave rise to tariffs above Chile’s bound rate. Bringing a claim against 
Chile’s price band was risky for Argentina because, at the time, and perhaps even continuing now, it maintained a price 
band for sugar. Argentina also knew that Chile could raise its applied rate toward the bound rate of 31.5%, an option that 
Argentina wished to avoid since Chile’s applied MFN rate was (and still is 6%) and the operation of the price band could 
lower the rate even below the applied rate, much less the bound rate of 31.5%.  
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action. In the end, the panel and Appellate Body reports had little legal effect, and the two sides 
moved on.  
A similar pattern appears to be developing in response to the Appellate Body decision in Peru-
Additional Duty. Following the decision, an arbitrator, Ricardo Ramirez, decided that Peru should 
comply with the decision by March 29, 2016. Peru maintained its PRS, but with reference prices that 
will now by published monthly.
24
 In this way, Peru aims to advance an argument that the PRS is no 
longer a “variable import levy” (since it only changes monthly), and thus an ordinary customs duty 
with an applied rate that is less than Peru’s tariff binding. Guatemala may commence an Article 21.5 
compliance proceeding that will drag the case through more legal hoops.  
The question posed before the Article 21.5 compliance panel will be where to draw the line 
between an “ordinary customs duty,” which countries can periodically change provided the duty 
remains beneath the tariff binding, and an “other duty or charge” in the form of a variable import levy 
which is prohibited. The answer is not obvious, especially if the stated goal of the Agreement on 
Agriculture is to provide greater predictability for traders. If Peru replaces its PRS with a system of 
periodically changing its ordinary customs duty through an administrative decision, the changes would 
be less predictable for traders. At the end of the day, the Appellate Body’s legal ruling, as that in 
Chile-Price Band, may be largely ignored or its effect undercut through other means, such as through 
a general safeguard measure, or by periodically raising the applied tariff rate. The political salience for 
Peru appears simply too great, as reflected in Peru’s efforts to sign FTAs with its major trading 
partners regarding the PRS. 
II. Peru’s Defense: Relation of the FTA to WTO Rules in a WTO Dispute 
Had Guatemala not signed an FTA with Peru, our analysis would be complete since the only issue 
would have been whether Peru’s PRS violated WTO rules, as the Appellate Body found. Our analysis 
would likewise be complete if a different WTO Member had brought the complaint, one that had not 
signed an FTA that permitted Peru to maintain the PRS. As shown above, variable levies impose costs 
on foreign traders by shifting the burden of price volatility abroad and by undermining the 
predictability of import taxes, and the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture bans them. Finally, since 
Peru never ratified the FTA so that the FTA never went into effect, there would be much less to assess 
had the Appellate Body not decided the case “irrespective of the status of the FTA as not being ratified 
by both parties.”25 It was because none of the above was the case, and particularly because of the 
breadth of the Appellate Body’s ruling, that the Peru-Additional Duties case has significant 
implications for global trade governance.  
The ability to use a PRS for this set of products (milk, maize, rice, and sugar) is politically salient 
for Peru. Between 2005-2015, Peru signed at least fifteen FTAs covering fifty WTO members: 
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, the EFTA states, the European Union 
(and its member states), Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea, Mexico, 
Panama, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States, in which these WTO members accepted Peru’s 
PRS. Peru negotiated such acceptance most recently under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) mega-
regional, and thus including with the U.S. in the event it ratifies the TPP (for FTA texts, see Annex 1, 
Saggi and Wu 2016).
26
 The WTO Appellate Body may have found that Peru’s PRS was unacceptable 
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 See Normas Legales, Decreto Supremo No. 055-2016-EF, available at 
http://www.elperuano.com.pe/NormasElperuano/2016/03/28/1360415-1.html (Articles 4 & 7). In addition, Peru capped 
the tariff at 20%. See Normas Legales, Decreto Supremo No. 103-2015-EF, available at 
http://www.elperuano.com.pe/NormasElperuano/2015/05/01/1232225-3.html (Article 2). 
25
 AB Report, paras. 5.106, and para. 5.28. 
26
 The TPP is not as clear as the Guatemala-Peru FTA and the other FTA texts, but nonetheless accepts Peru’s PRS. The 
TPP provides that for the products in question, Peru’s customs duties shall be as follows: “(i) the ad valorem duty shall 
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under WTO rules; but Peru negotiated specific rules accepting the PRS with all of its most important 
trading partners, covering over 95% of Peru’s trade. 
In the case of the Peru-Guatemala FTA, Guatemala agreed that “Peru may maintain its Price Range 
System established in Decree no. 1152001EF.” The FTA also addressed the issue of inconsistencies 
between the FTA and WTO agreements. Although, in the first paragraph of FTA Article 1.3, the 
parties “confirm their existing mutual rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement and other 
agreements to which they may be parties,” the second paragraph clarifies that, “[i]n the event of any 
inconsistency between this Treaty and the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 [such as the WTO 
Agreement], this Treaty shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, unless otherwise provided in 
this Treaty.”  
The critical question is: what is the relation of FTA provisions as a defense to WTO rules? Will the 
WTO Appellate Body address and recognize bilateral agreements, such as that between Peru and 
Guatemala, or will the Appellate Body be an obstacle to them? In public international law, in the event 
of a conflict between provisions in two agreements, two canons of interpretation help resolve it. One is 
the rule of lex posterior, codified in Article 30(3) and (4) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties (Vienna Convention), which provides that a later-in-time rule prevails over the earlier one. 
The other is the principle of lex specialis, cited in WTO jurisprudence, which provides that where two 
sets of laws govern the same factual situation, the more specific law overrides the more general one.
27
 
Where one rule is a multilateral rule and the other a bilateral rule, Article 41 of the Vienna Convention 
further provides that two parties may modify a multilateral treaty between themselves, under certain 
conditions, reflecting the lex posterior rule.  
All of these rules are grounded in the principle of the contractual freedom of states to specify and 
modify the rights and obligations existing between them. Although, as we have seen, the Appellate 
Body found that WTO rules prohibit the use of Peru’s PRS for WTO members’ imports, may Peru 
agree with particular WTO members that it may use its PRS system as regards their bilateral trade 
relations? Peru has done so through express agreements that are more specific and later in time with 
all of the major trading nations. Peru should thus normally prevail under public international law 
before a court of general jurisdiction if the FTA had been in effect.  
The FTA provision permitting Peru’s PRS, however, was clearly inconsistent with the Appellate 
Body’s former interpretation of applicable WTO rules. The existence of such inconsistency raises a 
series of questions that the Appellate Body could address more clearly. First, what is the applicable 
law before the WTO once a WTO tribunal is seized with a WTO complaint: only the WTO “covered 
agreements” or the WTO agreements in light of other international law? Although WTO tribunals only 
have jurisdiction to hear complaints under the WTO covered agreements, there is disagreement among 
scholars as to whether WTO respondents may validly raise defenses under other international law 
before WTO tribunals.
28
 Second, if a WTO tribunal may refer to other international law (such as 
another international treaty) as a defense (whether as a waiver of the right to bring a WTO claim or as 
a modification of the rules applicable between the parties), was there a conflict between the FTA rules 
and WTO rules, such that conflict-of-laws rules apply? Third, if conflict-of-laws rules apply, what was 
(Contd.)                                                                  
be eliminated entirely on the date of entry into force of this Agreement for Peru; and (ii) the specific duty derived from 
the application of the Peruvian Price Range System established in the D.S. N° 115-2001-EF and its amendments, any 
future modification or any succeeding system shall be excluded from any tariff elimination.” TPP, Annex 2-D, Tariff 
Schedule of Peru, General Notes, paras. 4(f) and (g).  
27
 Pauwelyn 2003, pp. 385-418. The doctrine has been recognized and applied in WTO jurisprudence regarding the relation 
of different WTO provisions. See Cook 2015, pp. 86-90. 
28
 Cf. Pauwelyn 2003a (focusing more on conflicts between WTO law and other bodies of law, such as human rights law); 
Pauwelyn 2003b (contending that defenses under international law may be raised); Pauwelyn 2016 (critiquing the 
Appellate Body’s decision in Peru-Additional Duties); Tracthman 1999 (only WTO law is applicable); Trachtman 2001; 
Marceau 2001 (contending that only WTO law is applicable, although other international law can affect the interpretation 
of WTO rules).  
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the parties’ intent under the FTA in the event of an inconsistency or conflict with WTO rules? Fourth, 
if a WTO dispute settlement panel is to recognize a defense under an FTA, must the FTA itself 
comply with WTO requirements? 
A. Peru’s Possible Defenses 
We commence this section with a brief overview of four primary ways Peru could raise a defense to 
Guatemala’s WTO complaint in relation to the FTA, had the FTA been in effect, because the 
Appellate Body interpreted the relation of WTO rules regardless of the FTA’s legal status. First, Peru 
could maintain that Guatemala had expressly waived its rights under the FTA to bring a WTO 
complaint against the PRS. Second, as a variant of the waiver defense, Peru could argue that 
Guatemala had expressly consented to the PRS, precluding a finding of wrongfulness under customary 
international law. Third, Peru could contend that, under customary rules of interpretation, WTO rules 
should be interpreted between FTA parties in light of the FTA. Fourth, Peru could maintain that the 
FTA modified WTO rules as between the FTA parties, and such modification should be recognized as 
a defense to the WTO complaint. Note that all these defenses serve to prevent or otherwise defend 
only against Guatemala bringing a WTO claim, not to justify the PRS so far as it applied to any other 
WTO Members. 
On the first defense, the WTO Agreement has a provision on waivers (Article X), but this provision 
governs waivers granted by all WTO Members, not the waiver by one Member in an inter se 
agreement with another Member. The Appellate Body has recognized the ability of a Member to 
waive a claim in relation to a mutually agreed solution to a WTO complaint, in the EC-Bananas 21.5 
(US) case (2008). The question arises whether a WTO Member can also agree to a waiver outside of a 
mutually agreed solution to a specific WTO complaint. In this respect, Article 45 of the International 
Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States (ILC Articles) provides that “the responsibility 
of a State may not be invoked if… the injured State has validly waived the claim.”  
On the second defense, which is a variant of the first, Article 20 of the ILC Articles provides that 
“valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness 
of that act in relation to the former State.” Consent is “a basic international law principle” that can be 
raised as a defense.
29
 It does not involve a change in substantive obligations (such as the modification 
of rights and obligations), but rather recognition that a state can consent to an action or measure 
otherwise in contravention of an international legal obligation, and that when it does, it cannot then 
claim responsibility from the other state. The ILC Commentary differentiates consent from a waiver in 
that a waiver concerns a situation where consent is given “after the conduct has occurred.”30 Article 20, 
however, would not apply if the WTO Agreement precludes the giving of bilateral consent to a WTO-
inconsistent measure, and rather requires a waiver granted by all WTO Members in compliance with 
Article X of the WTO Agreement. Alternatively, a WTO panel might not permit such a defense if the 
FTA containing the consent itself is in violation of GATT requirements. 
On the third defense, Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides 
that the WTO agreements are to be interpreted “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation 
of international law.” Such customary rules provide means for interpreting WTO provisions, including 
in light of other international law. However, such other international law should be relevant to the 
interpretation of the WTO provisions in question, and it cannot modify their terms, but only help 
clarify their meaning. Moreover, such interpretations will apply to all WTO Members, and not just to 
the parties to a dispute.  
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On the fourth defense, Article 41 of the Vienna Convention permits parties to modify a multilateral 
treaty inter se so long as the following conditions apply: 
(i) “the modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty”; 
(ii) the modification “does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the 
treaty”; 
(iii) the modification “does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.” 
The question is whether all of these conditions apply. The WTO treaties do not (at least expressly) 
prohibit inter se modifications. The modification arguably does not affect the de facto enjoyment of 
other WTO parties of their rights, and neither is it incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
WTO treaties as a whole.  
Many scholars nonetheless argue that WTO panels and the Appellate Body are limited to 
interpreting the WTO “covered agreements,” which are lex specialis, so that only provisions of the 
WTO agreements, as interpreted in accordance with customary international law, can be used as a 
defense to a WTO complaint (Tracthman 1999; Trachtman 2001; Marceau 2001). These scholars cite 
various provisions of the DSU for support, such as DSU Article 3.2, which provides that the DSU 
“serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements,” and DSU 
Article 19.2, which provides that panel and Appellate Body rulings “cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements” (emphasis added). 31  Bartels (2001) 
maintains that these provisions constitute an implicit conflicts rule, and provide that WTO texts 
prevail in the event of a conflict.  
Alternatively, however, these provisions can be viewed as statements against judicial activism in 
the interpretation of WTO legal texts, while saying nothing about contracting out of conventional 
public international law conflicts rules, especially since they contain no conflicts language within them. 
None of these WTO provisions, for example, is like Article 103 of the UN Charter that provides, in the 
event of a conflict with any other international agreement, the “obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail.” Thus, other scholars stress that the WTO is an international treaty and, as such, is part 
of public international law (Pauwelyn 2003). They contend that, although WTO panels only have 
jurisdiction to hear complaints under WTO law, the WTO agreements do not provide that WTO 
Members have contracted out of defenses that they otherwise have under public international law, 
including under other treaties pursuant to Article 41 of the Vienna Convention and Article 20 of the 
ILC Articles.  
To the extent that one accepts that other international law may apply as a defense, one must then 
assess whether there is a conflict between the two treaties. Some scholars maintain a narrow definition 
of a “conflict,” one in which a conflict occurs only if it is impossible to comply with both treaties 
simultaneously. Under such view of a “conflict,” obligations always prevail over permissions. Since 
the FTA provision is permissive and not obligatory, there would thus be no conflict. We find (with 
Pauwelyn, 2003) that such a narrow definition of conflict would fail to recognize the intent of the 
parties, and would mean that obligations always trump permissions, thereby curtailing Members’ 
policy space against their express agreement. As the Appellate Body itself pointed out in the 
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Guatemala-Peru dispute, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides that Peru “shall not 
maintain” the PRS while the FTA provides that Peru “may maintain” the PRS.32 
The Peru-Guatemala FTA contains a conflict-of-laws rule, as noted above. FTA Article 1.3 
provides, “[i]n the event of any inconsistency between this Treaty and the agreements referred to in 
paragraph 1 [such as the WTO Agreement], this Treaty shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, 
unless otherwise provided in this Treaty.” Thus, were the FTA in force, the Appellate Body, in 
application of Article 41 of the Vienna Convention, arguably should have recognized the parties’ 
express intent, unless the Appellate Body were to find that WTO Members had contracted out of 
customary international law and created a largely self-contained WTO regime. Had these waiver, 
consent, and modification defenses been raised before an international court of general jurisdiction 
(such as the International Court of Justice), Peru likely would have prevailed if the FTA were in force. 
But it prevailed before neither the WTO panel nor the Appellate Body, and the Appellate Body stated 
that its ruling would not have been altered had the FTA been in effect.
33
  
B. FTA Defenses Raised by Peru; the Panel and Appellate Body Rulings 
Peru’s failure to ratify the FTA constrained the defenses it could raise, and so Peru attempted to base 
its defense largely on WTO texts. Peru argued before the panel that Guatemala had failed to act in 
“good faith” in bringing its complaint, which violated Guatemala’s obligations under Articles 3.7 and 
3.10 of the DSU.
34
 Because the FTA was not in force, Peru cited Article 18 of the Vienna Convention 
which provides that “[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty” that it has signed and that is in the process of ratification. As an alternative 
argument, Peru maintained that the FTA had modified Guatemala’s rights under the WTO framework 
by maintaining that Peru could maintain its PRS, but this was a weak argument because the FTA was 
not in effect. 
In response, the panel grounded its analysis on the fact that the FTA was not in force, and that a 
“treaty only begins to produce legal effects and bind the parties from the moment it enters into 
force.”35 Since the treaty was not in effect, it created no legal obligations on Guatemala. Regarding 
Peru’s reference to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, the panel responded that the question of the 
“defeat of the object and purpose” of a non-WTO treaty lay outside the panel’s terms of reference, 
which was to examine the matter brought by Guatemala “in the light of the relevant provisions of the 
covered agreements.”36 On the issue of modification, the panel ruled: “[i]n light of this fact [that the 
treaty was not ratified], it is not necessary for this Panel to express an opinion on whether the parties 
may, through the FTA, modify between themselves their rights and obligations under the covered 
agreements, or whether there is a conflict of rules between the FTA and the covered agreements….”37  
In its appeal, Peru expanded its defense to contend that Guatemala had waived its rights to bring a 
WTO complaint against Peru’s PRS after Guatemala accepted the PRS in the FTA. Peru bolstered this 
defense by citing Articles 20 and 45 of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States. Peru, however, 
no longer maintained that the FTA had modified its WTO obligations, but rather contended that the 
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WTO provisions should be interpreted in light of the FTA. The Appellate Body, since its creation, has 
recognized that WTO rules are to be interpreted in light of the customary rules set forth in Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Article 31(3) provides the following regarding a treaty’s 
interpretation: 
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties” (emphasis added). 
Peru maintained that the FTA was a “subsequent agreement between the parties” to the dispute, and 
that ILC Articles 20 and 45 were “relevant rules of international law” for the interpretation of the 
covered agreements.  
The Appellate Body could have simply upheld the panel on the ground that the FTA had not 
entered into force.
38
 Instead, the Appellate Body went beyond such reasoning to find in favor of 
Guatemala by stressing that its findings were “irrespective of the status of the FTA as not being 
ratified by both parties,”39 and suggesting that modifications of trade rules through an FTA cannot be 
raised as a defense to a WTO complaint. As a result, the Appellate Body suggested that the WTO is 
largely a self-contained regime since it found that, although other international law can inform the 
meaning of WTO legal texts, it cannot be raised as a defense to protect Member’s policy space when it 
conflicts with WTO obligations.
40
  
In response to the good faith and waiver defenses, the Appellate Body found that Guatemala had 
“not clearly waived its right to recourse” to the DSU. Importantly, the Appellate Body did “not 
exclude the possibility of articulating the relinquishing of the right to initiate WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings in a form other than a waiver embodied in a mutually agreed solution [to a WTO 
dispute].”41 Nonetheless, it stressed a series of conditions for it to recognize such a waiver. First, “any 
such relinquishment must be made clearly” (emphasis added).42 Second, such relinquishment “should 
be ascertained… in relation to, or within the context of, the rules and procedures of the DSU.”43 Third, 
the relinquishment may not go “beyond the settlement of specific disputes.”44 Fourth, the Appellate 
Body warned that “the DSU emphasizes that ‘[a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties’ must be 
“consistent with the covered agreements” (emphasis added).45  
These conditions will need to be clarified, but appear to go beyond WTO textual requirements. For 
example, why must a waiver apply to a specific dispute rather than a general obligation, so long as no 
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other WTO party is harmed?
46
 Moreover, the last condition suggests that WTO Members can never 
waive their rights to bring a WTO complaint regarding a WTO-inconsistent provision. But what else is 
a waiver except permission for a party to engage in conduct that otherwise would be inconsistent with 
its obligations? Moreover, the provision it cites, DSU Article 3.7, only provides that a solution 
“consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred,” not that it is required. Parties 
should be able to consent among themselves to measures that the Appellate Body would otherwise 
find violate WTO rules, provided other WTO Members are not adversely affected, as reflected in 
Article 20 of the ILC Articles. The Appellate Body’s dicta is thus problematic to the extent it calls on 
panels to ignore parties’ clearly expressed intent. 
To support its conclusion, the Appellate Body found that it was ambiguous in this case whether 
Guatemala consented to modify WTO rules with Peru, and thus waive its WTO rights, especially since 
FTA Article 1.3 confirms the FTA parties’ WTO rights.47 The Appellate Body thus saw “no reason to 
address further Peru’s arguments that ILC Articles 20 and 45 provide additional support for its [waiver] 
argument,” or Peru’s arguments regarding Article 18 of the Vienna Convention. 48  The Appellate 
Body’s position, however, is counterbalanced by the fact that the FTA expressly provides that “Peru 
may maintain its Price Range System established in Decree no. 1152001EF,” and that the FTA 
contains a clear conflicts clause which provides: “In the event of any inconsistency between this 
Treaty and the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 [the WTO agreements], this Treaty shall prevail 
to the extent of the inconsistency, unless otherwise provided in this Treaty” (emphasis added). One 
could argue that the parties affirmed their desire to remain within WTO rules but believed (at the time, 
and Peru still believes) that the PRS complied with those rules. In such case, if it turned out that the 
PRS contravenes WTO rules, one could argue that it does not follow that Peru no longer needs to 
comply with WTO rules, but rather that the PRS must change. However, that argument seems 
distorting given the fact that, as between the parties, the agreement expressly states that the PRS may 
be maintained and that FTA rules “shall prevail” “in the event of any inconsistency” with WTO rules. 
On the issue of interpretation, the Appellate Body found that WTO rules could not be interpreted to 
permit the PRS in light of the FTA because to do so would manifestly contradict the WTO’s text, as 
previously interpreted by the Appellate Body. As the Appellate Body noted, it would have to interpret 
the terms “shall not maintain” in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture as “may maintain” in 
light of the FTA.
49
 The Appellate Body rightly stressed that Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention 
provides that the “treaty shall be interpreted” as a whole, and “not the treaty as it may apply between 
some of its parties.”50 In sum, the Appellate Body correctly found that a WTO provision should not 
have different meanings for different WTO Members. Thus, to the extent that the Appellate Body is 
correct that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture prohibits the use of Peru’s PRS, the language 
of the FTA contradicts that meaning and thus does not serve to clarify its “interpretation” under the 
Vienna Convention.  
Although Peru focused its defense before the Appellate Body on the “interpretation” of WTO 
provisions, the Appellate Body rightly noted that Peru implicitly argued that the FTA had “modified” 
its obligations toward Guatemala.
51
 In dicta, the Appellate Body then addressed under what conditions 
it would recognize such modification. It strongly suggested, “assuming arguendo that the provision of 
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the FTA allowed Peru to maintain a WTO-inconsistent PRS,” that Peru could not modify its WTO 
commitments through the FTA.
52
 The Appellate Body noted that the WTO contains its own provisions 
for the amendment of WTO rules (Article X of the WTO Agreement) and for their interpretation by 
the membership (Article IX), as well as rules for the creation of an FTA that might be used as a 
defense to a WTO complaint (Article XXIV of GATT 1994).
53
 The Appellate Body suggested that 
these provisions exclusively cover the modification of WTO rules, so that “we are not convinced” that 
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention applies.
54
 It suggested, in other words, that WTO Members had 
contracted out of Article 41 of the Vienna Convention through the WTO’s own rules on amendments 
and exceptions.  
Regarding the application of the GATT Article XXIV exception for FTAs, the Appellate Body 
noted two conditions for raising a defense under an FTA, citing its earlier decision in Turkey-Textiles 
(1999): (i) that the measure at issue is introduced upon formation of the FTA that meets Article XXIV 
requirements; and (ii) that the FTA would have been prevented were the party not permitted to 
introduce the measure.
55
 Neither of these two conditions would have been met because Peru’s PRS 
preceded the FTA and arguably was not necessary for the FTA (although Peru certainly suggested that 
it was important given its refusal to ratify the agreement after Guatemala commenced the WTO 
dispute). Moreover, the Appellate Body stressed that the FTA exception is to facilitate trade and closer 
integration, and not to provide “a broad defense for measures in FTAs that roll back on Members’ 
rights and obligations under the WTO agreements.”56  
This Appellate Body dicta again problematically refuses to recognize WTO Members’ contractual 
freedom to update and modify the rules that apply between them through FTAs, such as to preserve 
policy space for the stabilization of agricultural prices. We contend that the WTO Appellate Body was 
wrong in suggesting that WTO law forecloses the use of all inter se modifications, especially the 
provisions that the Appellate Body cited — Article X of the WTO Agreement and GATT Article 
XXIV. First, Article X of the WTO Agreement provides procedures where amendments apply to all 
WTO Members, but it does not contract out of Article 41 of the Vienna Convention regarding inter se 
modifications between WTO Members that meet Article 41’s conditions. Second, GATT Article 
XXIV provides an exception to WTO most-favored-nation (MFN) rules where a party forms an FTA 
or a customs union that meets specified conditions. But it does not contract away parties’ contractual 
freedom to modify WTO provisions inter se so long as the FTA meets those conditions. GATT Article 
XXIV is about inter se trade liberalization as a condition for a deviation from MFN treatment; it is not 
about inter se consent to a non-MFN related measure that does not adversely affect other WTO 
Members (i.e. outside the object of the GATT Article XXIV exception clause). Moreover, GATT 
Article XXIV is an exception to a GATT obligation, and not to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, 
which was at the center of the dispute. 
It seems wrong to insist that the WTO Members in 1994 foreclosed themselves from ever entering 
into inter se modifications of WTO rules that could be recognized as a defense to a WTO complaint 
between themselves for the rest of time, unless they agree (in practice by consensus) to amend the 
WTO agreements. By recognizing FTA rights, the Appellate Body would not diminish WTO rights 
and obligations through its interpretation. Rather, it would recognize parties’ express modifications 
through a political process of their WTO rights and obligations between themselves. The Appellate 
Body would uphold, and not diminish, the rights and obligations to which they agreed. Nonetheless, 
we raise an alternative response that the Appellate Body did not address in its decision: the WTO 
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dispute settlement system should only recognize an FTA provision as a defense to a WTO complaint if 
the FTA itself complies with WTO requirements. 
C. What Can Be Done: Three Judicial and Three Political Options 
Given changes in global trade and Member preferences since the WTO agreements’ conclusion in 
1994, and given that the WTO political mechanism is blocked so that rules, interpretations, and 
understandings are not being updated or clarified through the WTO’s political processes, it is 
important to find appropriate ways for WTO Members to define their trade relations through a 
political mechanism. This is particularly the case given complaints by some WTO members and 
commentators that the Appellate Body has engaged in judicial activism and “gap-filling” in 
interpreting WTO rules (Cartland, Depayre & Woznowski 2012). To the extent that the WTO text 
itself is ambiguous, as Bagwell and Sykes (2004) wrote regarding the Appellate Body’s earlier Chile-
Price Band decision), there is an even more demanding case that the Appellate Body should defer to 
Members that clarify, through a political mechanism, their understanding of the rules that apply 
between them. Even if the WTO rules are patently clear, if the WTO political process is blocked, 
Members should be able to negotiate the rules that apply between them outside of the WTO, as 
recognized under public international law.  
So what can be done? There are a number of options that can be pursued, judicially and politically. 
Judicially, the Appellate Body can fend off the application of FTA rules or find ways to facilitate 
greater coherence between WTO and FTA rules. Politically, WTO Members can take different 
initiatives that vary in their ambition. 
1. Three Judicial Options. A first judicial option, reflected in the Appellate Body’s ruling, is to 
prohibit defenses under FTAs other than express waivers of the right to bring a WTO complaint. 
Under this scenario, WTO rules exist in parallel to FTAs, but FTA rules cannot be invoked before the 
WTO dispute settlement system as a defense unless there is an express waiver of a WTO right. The 
Appellate Body left the door ajar for a Member to expressly waive the right to bring a WTO claim 
through an FTA so long as the waiver is clear.
57
 Peru thus might have prevailed had the parties added 
a sentence such as “Guatemala consents to the PRS and waives any rights it may have to challenge the 
PRS under WTO rules.” But this position does not make it easy for negotiators of FTAs since it is 
impossible to know in advance how a measure such as the PRS will be applied, and the WTO dispute 
settlement system is more effective than FTA dispute settlement mechanisms. FTAs thus generally do 
not contain express waivers of the right to bring a WTO complaint,
58
 even though the FTAs might be 
quite clear regarding the particular rights and obligations at issue, and the rules that the parties wish to 
prevail in the event of an inconsistency. Such a position will constrain the utility of negotiating 
exceptions under an FTA to enhance policy space, such as Peru’s PRS. 
A second judicial option would be for the Appellate Body to reverse course and apply conflict rules 
under international law, such as Article 41 of the Vienna Convention, since the WTO Agreement does 
not expressly prohibit inter se modifications of WTO rules, and parties should be granted the 
contractual freedom to update the trade rules that apply between them. The WTO Appellate Body 
could likewise recognize that FTA rules constitute “consent” to a measure that would otherwise 
violate WTO obligations, and thus preclude a finding of wrongful conduct (per Article 20 of the ILC 
Articles), provided (i) that the consent is sufficiently clear and (ii) that other WTO Members are not 
adversely affected by it.  
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A third judicial option, which we advance, is to permit a defense under an FTA so long as the 
respondent proves that the FTA meets the two core requirements under GATT Article XXIV regarding 
FTAs (i.e. that duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on “substantially all” 
trade among the parties, and duties and other trade restrictions are not raised against other WTO 
Members). The additional conditions that the Appellate Body cited from its earlier Appellate Body 
decision in Turkey-Textiles (1999) should not be relevant (such as necessity for the creation of an FTA) 
since those conditions come from the preamble of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV concerning the raising 
of a defense against a MFN-violation. Unlike Turkey, Peru was not raising new trade restrictions 
against a non-FTA party in violation of the MFN clause, but rather only against an FTA party, and 
with that party’s express consent. Under this third option, defenses could be raised under an FTA, but 
only provided there was no successful challenge that the FTA did not meet GATT Article XXIV’s two 
core requirements, namely (i) liberalization of “substantially all trade” among FTA members; and (ii) 
no raising of trade restrictions against other WTO Members.
59
 
Were the FTA’s consistency with GATT Article XXIV to be addressed and the Appellate Body to 
find that the FTA was inconsistent with either of these two GATT Article XXIV requirements, the 
Appellate Body would then decline to recognize provisions of the FTA as a defense to WTO rules. 
This approach would help to discipline FTAs, and encourage FTA members to negotiate agreements 
that are consistent with GATT Article XXIV. Nonetheless, this approach runs the risk that the political 
and judicial stresses of actually verifying the consistency of FTAs with GATT Article XXIV – a task 
that the GATT and the WTO have studiously avoided – would worsen the current political stalemate 
in the WTO. There is also the possible danger that FTAs have become so strongly the locus of trade-
policy making that the WTO and its multilateral system of surveillance become irrelevant.  
2. Three Political Options. If the Appellate Body’s dicta in Peru-Additional Duty effectively 
eliminates the ability of WTO Members to raise FTA defenses, then WTO Members can turn to 
political options that range in their ambition. First, in complement with the first judicial option, 
individual WTO Members could write into their FTAs clear and express waivers of their rights to 
bring a WTO complaint in relation to specific measures (such as Peru’s PRS). The Appellate Body 
already has recognized that it must interpret other international treaties, whether in the context of 
waivers, interpreting WTO obligations, or interpreting WTO provisions that incorporate other 
international treaties (Palmeter & Mavroidis 1998; Pauwelyn 2016). Yet, this option could be of 
limited value, largely because the FTA dispute settlement mechanisms do not provide the certainty 
and predictability that the WTO provides so that Members will be wary of waiving their right to bring 
a WTO complaint.  
Second, if the Appellate Body does not change its position, a more ambitious solution would be for 
the WTO membership to create a protocol confirming that WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body 
are authorized to raise FTA provisions as defenses to WTO claims, so long as the defense does not 
prejudice the rights or obligations of any WTO Member that is not a party to the FTA. Such 
confirmation would be a signal to the Appellate Body that WTO provisions for amendments of the 
WTO agreements (applying to all WTO Members) do not supersede Article 41 of the Vienna 
Convention concerning inter se modifications of rights and obligations as a defense to a WTO 
complaint. 
Third, a much more ambitious approach would be to transform the WTO dispute settlement system 
into a system of general jurisdiction for all trade agreements that contain a compromissory clause 
recognizing its jurisdiction, and that provide adequate funding to support any necessary expansion of 
the WTO secretariat, panels, and Appellate Body (Trebilcock 2015; Flett 2015). The WTO already 
hires additional secretariat members for particular cases (the Boeing-Airbus case being a notorious 
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example) and panelists are funded on an ad hoc basis. Such adaptation is easily conceivable, although 
the membership of the Appellate Body may need to be expanded slightly.  
Under this scenario, the WTO dispute settlement system would be able to hear complaints, as well 
as defenses, under FTAs. New issues would of course arise based on the FTA’s updating and 
clarification of trade rules. That is not a problem, however, because it is what the WTO as a 
negotiating forum was supposed to do. Since the Doha Round of trade negotiations has collapsed, and 
since the political process for updating and clarifying rules has migrated to FTAs, this approach 
contends that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should be adapted. Otherwise the WTO judicial 
process and the FTA political process will be in tension, imbalanced, and incoherent. Over time, the 
last bastions of WTO relevance — WTO monitoring bodies and dispute settlement — could slowly 
die. Such a more pluralist approach to trade negotiations, moreover, could have the advantage that it 
facilitates the ability of sovereign countries to tailor rules to their differing contexts in a diverse world. 
The WTO institution would, under this scenario, remain critical in keeping FTAs under multilateral 
surveillance so as to ensure greater trust and potentially facilitate their inclusivity over time, possibly 
leading to the amendment of WTO rules for the entire membership. 
It is unlikely that WTO Members can reach agreement over either of the last two political options, 
given the difficulty of reaching consensus among over 160 WTO Members. Thus, pressure will 
increase on the Appellate Body to interpret WTO rules for today’s changed landscape, and to find 
ways to accept defenses under WTO-consistent FTAs. As trade agreements proliferate and possibly 
extend to mega-regionals such as the TPP, the WTO needs to stay relevant. One way is by 
contributing to the systemic integration of politically negotiated trade outcomes through the WTO 
judicial mechanism. In its very first case, US-Reformulated Gasoline (1996, p. 17), the Appellate 
Body wrote that WTO rules should not be read “in clinical isolation from public international law.” 
The WTO Appellate Body has integrated public international law concerns over the environment and 
public health through its interpretation of the open-ended language of GATT Article XX. The new 
challenge for the Appellate Body is how to address the sprawling world of FTAs in WTO 
jurisprudence. 
Conclusion  
Peru-Additional Duty raises the question of how a WTO dispute settlement panel and the Appellate 
Body should respond when a party accepts a measure in an FTA and then brings a complaint that the 
measure violates WTO rules. It is not an isolated issue. Studies show that significant numbers of FTAs 
contain provisions that appear to cut back on WTO liberalization requirements as applied among FTA 
Members, such as regarding export restrictions (Zhang 2016). 
Peru bound its tariffs for the four categories of agricultural products in question at 68%. It then 
lowered its applied tariff rate to 0%, but subject to a Price Range System where tariffs can increase on 
a fortnightly basis (although no more than the binding) if the international market price is less than the 
monthly average price over the previous five years. In parallel, Peru signed a series of FTAs where the 
contracting parties arguably consent to its use of the PRS, signaling that Peru wishes to contract out of 
WTO rules to the extent that the PRS violates them. 
Peru’s PRS seeks to stabilize agricultural prices in Peru and offer a degree of protection to Peruvian 
producers. We show that the Peruvian PRS is less restrictive than the classic variable levy used by the 
E.U., which was the object of contention during the Uruguay Round, but it still shares many of its 
features. Given the evolution of world prices since the PRS was instituted in 2001, the PRS has turned 
out to have a rather slight stabilizing effect and a more significant protective effect, although it 
remains much less protectionist than Peru’s tariff binding. 
WTO rules, and in particular Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, prohibit the use of 
variable import levies. The Appellate Body, following its earlier jurisprudence in Chile-Price Band, 
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held that the PRS was effectively a variable import levy and likely a minimum import price in 
violation of Article 4.2 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.  
A critical question, however, remained: whether the Peru-Guatemala FTA, which provides that 
Peru “may maintain” the PRS, could be used as a defense to the WTO complaint from Guatemala. The 
panel avoided the issue by noting that Peru had not ratified the FTA. The Appellate Body, in contrast, 
went beyond this reasoning and suggested that FTA rules cannot be used as a defense. Such a 
suggestion has significant systemic implications, especially given global political developments and 
the proliferation of FTAs.
 
It might appear presumptuous for a WTO tribunal to find that WTO rules 
forever trump FTA rules regarding Members’ policy space, even when the FTA complies with WTO 
requirements, and the FTA rules are later in time, directly on point, respond to dissatisfaction with an 
earlier Appellate Body ruling, do not adversely affect other WTO Members, and public international 
law provides rules that enable a panel to avoid an outcome that would violate the parties’ contractual 
freedom and their clear intent. 
We presented a number of judicial and political alternative courses of action to address this 
situation. These alternatives include permitting clear consents or waivers as a defense, permitting the 
use of FTA provisions as a defense if there is a conflict with a WTO rule provided the FTA complies 
with GATT Article XXIV’s requirements, and fully incorporating FTA rules into the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Where FTAs are not consistent with GATT Article XXIV’s requirements, there is a 
good argument not to recognize FTA provisions as a defense to an otherwise valid WTO complaint. 
However, if the Appellate Body does not recognize provisions in valid FTAs as defenses, the WTO 
judicial process will fail to take into account Member’s agreements regarding the rules that apply 
between them. The WTO would risk becoming irrelevant since FTAs are where trade policy is 
currently being formulated. Irrelevance would be costly since the WTO provides critical global 
services, including inclusive, non-discriminatory, multilateral rules, multilateral surveillance, and 
dispute settlement. An ongoing challenge for the WTO and its Members is how the WTO dispute 
settlement system engages with FTAs. The saga continues. 
Appendix: 
A. The Uruguay Round Negotiations on Agriculture. 
The frictions over agriculture between the U.S. and the E.U. are well documented (Josling and 
Tangermann, 2015). Disputes about domestic support and export subsidies were the most contentious, 
but the highly constrained access to the E.U. market was also a major sore: it affected some U.S. 
exporters directly and it was an indispensable prop to the domestic support system, which raised 
internal prices and thus boosted E.U. output. The Kennedy Round of negotiations (1973-77) failed to 
address these frictions and they grew worse over the subsequent years. The GATT Ministerial of 1982 
established a Committee on Trade in Agriculture, although the latter’s deliberations served mostly to 
highlight the differences between the U.S. and the E.U. With pressure to start a new trade round to 
help spur international growth, an apparent compromise was reached in the Punte del Este Declaration 
of 1986 (GATT, 1986) that initiated the Uruguay Round. It stated, inter alia, 
Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all 
measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more 
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines [and reduce] … import barriers; 
The U.S.’s opening position was that this required the abolition of all trade distorting subsidies 
(including market access restrictions) over ten years – the so-called ‘zero-option’. The mid-term 
review in Montreal, December 1988 collapsed over agriculture, but the so-called Geneva Accord in 
early 1989 revived talks and called for position papers by December of that year. The U.S.’s paper 
called for the prohibition of all import barriers not explicitly permitted by the GATT; the approach 
FTAs as Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement: Was the Appellate Body Wrong in Peru-Additional Duty (DS457)? 
27 
called for the conversion of all import barriers into tariffs – so-called tariffication – and then to reduce 
these tariffs gradually to zero through negotiations.
60
 The E.U. conceded the principle of reform but 
offered little in practice. The supposedly ‘final’ Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in December 1990 
collapsed, largely on the rocks of agriculture, but talks resumed early in 1991. In a series of high-level 
meetings, each side slowly conceded ground – constrained in part by domestic political pressures – 
and in December 1991, Director-General Dunkel felt ready to issue a draft text, which he hoped would 
be completed by April 1992. This goal proved impossible and the high-level bilateral and plurilateral 
negotiations continued throughout 1992, given added focus by a U.S. threat to impose sanctions in an 
ongoing dispute with the E.U. about oilseeds.  
U.S. and E.U. negotiators met at Blair House in Washington DC in November 1992 and apparently 
settled their remaining differences, but in fact neither the U.S. nor the E.U. could get full internal 
agreement to it and the negotiations dragged on until December 1993. The new Director-General of 
the GATT, Peter Sutherland, had set a drop-dead date of 15
th
 December for completion. As Croome 
(1999, p. 316) notes, it was obvious that the Round would close only when agreement was reached 
between the U.S. and the E.U. While agricultural market access was not the only contentious issue, it 
was arguably the most critical. Other countries made offers and expressed positions, but they argued 
that everything was conditional on the ultimate U.S.-E.U. agreement. The two sides reached 
agreement on agriculture on the 9
th
 December, but other issues, including an exception for Japan on its 
rice market, kept negotiations rolling until 7:30pm on the 15
th
 December, at which point The Draft 
Final Act of the Uruguay Round was presented and approved.
61
  
The Final Act encompassed the Agreement on Agriculture, Article 4.2 of which prohibited 
“…measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties…” 
with its ostensibly clarificatory footnote that these “included … variable import levies, minimum 
import prices, … and similar border measures….” This provision lies at the heart of the Chile–Price 
Band and Peru–Additional Duty disputes that we discuss below.  
The history of the Round offers one last powerful insight into what negotiators intended or 
expected. Agreement on the Final Act left a huge amount of technical detail to be completed before its 
signature by April 1994, including the preparation of countries’ final schedules of concessions. The 
key element of the latter was the so-called ‘Modalities’ published on 20th December 1993 
(MTN.GNG/MA/W/24), which specified how the schedules were to be completed. Annex III, Section 
A, paragraph 1, of the Modalities states: 
“The policy coverage of tariffication shall include all border measures other than ordinary customs 
duties such as: quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, … 
and any other schemes similar to those listed above, whether or not the measures are maintained 
under country-specific derogations from the provisions of the GATT 1947.” (Emphasis added) 
Although the Modalities provide that they “shall not be used as a basis for dispute settlement 
proceedings” (p. 1), the text makes clear the expectation that everything other than “ordinary customs 
duties” was liable to tariffication.  
Also important for our purposes is the timetable, which stipulated that “The [Uruguay Round] 
Protocol itself will be opened for signature at the Special Ministerial Session Schedule for 12 to 15 
April 1994,” and that  
 “In order to meet this time limit each participant is required to submit its draft final Schedule to 
the Secretariat for circulation to all participants not later than 15 February 1994. There will then be 
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 GATT, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/97.  
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 Domestic pressures in the E.U. contributed to its willingness to settle on agriculture – e.g. the cost of support and the 
prospect of enlargement – but they did not require the abolition of variable levies. The latter, in our view, was largely due 
to the Round. 
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a period for verification of the draft final Schedules until 31 March 1994 to ensure that the results 
negotiated and agreed are accurately reflected in the Schedules.” 
The run up to the 15
th
 December 1993 had been a ‘phoney war’ for most participants most of the time. 
Although positions had been stated and bilateral negotiations undertaken, they were always 
overshadowed by the possibility (often, apparent likelihood) that they would be rendered moot by 
E.U.-U.S. agreement or lack of it. Moreover, while Hatherway and Ingco (1996, p. 38) state that the 
modalities were often over-ridden by bilateral negotiations of a request and offer nature in the first few 
weeks of 1994, it is unrealistic to believe that this was a considered, thorough negotiation. The 
timetable was extremely tight and all members had been worn down by the constant uncertainty of a 
seven-year dispute between the two trading giants. To have challenged another party’s Schedule after 
submission and thus to endanger the delicate balance that had been achieved to complete the Round 
was just about unthinkable.
62
 Thus one cannot plausibly argue that because Peru’s PRS (in its earlier 
guise) was not challenged in the Round, it had been accepted by WTO Members.
63
 
The protracted negotiation and the domestic pressures on the U.S. and E.U. negotiators stripped the 
Round of most of its liberalising effect in agriculture. Even without dirty tariffication, the base for 
tariffication was set as 1986-88, a period of very low world prices and hence high protective effect for 
non-tariff barriers. Many developing countries had unbound tariffs at the start of the Round and so 
were able to schedule ‘ceiling bindings’ (bindings unrelated to any objective indicator at all), rather 
than tariffication. Tariff reductions from the base levels were to have a simple average of 36% with a 
minimum of 15%, so that high tariffs needed only be reduced by the 15% minimum. Several countries 
received extended time periods for reductions. Moreover, the reductions in export subsidies and 
domestic support were mild, at least relative to hopes at the beginning of the Round.  
Thus, as early as 1995, commentators claimed that the Round’s main achievement in agriculture 
was not that agricultural trade barriers had actually been reduced but that the system had been 
rationalised and that through tariffication the means to future liberalisation had been secured. 
Hathaway and Ingco (1995) write: “The promise of the Uruguay Round agreement really lies in the 
future it makes possible. The groundwork has been laid for serious trade liberalization in the next 
round of negotiations.” If this is what WTO Members got from seven years’ hard politicking, it is easy 
to see why trade officials, especially those from agricultural exporting nations, became so wedded to 
the principle of tariffication and the elimination of variable levy and minimum import price schemes. 
Of the six third party statements reported in Annex C to the Panel report of Peru-Additional Duty, the 
three from large agricultural exporters – Argentina, Brazil and the U.S. – not surprisingly insist that 
Peru’s PRS was not consistent with WTO rules.64  
B. The data  
The ceiling and floor prices are drawn from six-monthly Supreme Decrees No. 115-2001-EF (21/June 
2001) to 164-2013- EF (29/June/2013). The reference price data are drawn from the fortnightly 
Resolución Ministerial, from No.225-2001-EF/15 (10/July/2001) to No.020-2013-EF/15.01 
(4/October/2013). The full list of sources is reported in the Panel Report 457R pp. 52-59. 
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 This point was as true for the U.S. and the E.U. as the others: each was aware of how its own and the other’s domestic 
politics could intervene and undermine the agreement.  
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 Additional evidence of the lack of scrutiny of the Schedules comes from the emergence of so-called ‘dirty tariffication’ – 
Ingco (1995). Ingco shows that many of the bindings that were entered into the schedules did not strictly apply the 
modalities and that deviations almost universally resulted in higher protection than the already high levels that they 
permitted.  
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